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What Constitutes an Assault?
William H. Erickson*
Historical Background
T HE COMMON LAW FORMS of action established the procedure
(writs) that an aggrieved person must follow if he was to
obtain redress for trespass to his person, in the King's court.'
The formalism, fiction, and confusion which gave birth to the
law which grants a plaintiff recovery for a tortious assault is to
be found "secreted in the interstices" of common law procedure. 2
The writs of trespass and that for trespass on the case provided
the only two writs which were available for tortious wrongs.
Trespass, which included a right of action for assault, was
basically criminal in character and was directed at serious
breaches of the King's peace.
Breach of the peace provided the King's court with a founda-
tion for taking jurisdiction and for granting relief when tortious
assaults occurred. In dealing with the injuries to the person, and
the type of injuries that would be likely to cause a breach of
the peace, the courts laid down the procedure and the limitative
boundaries of trespass. Trespass was available to obtain re-
dress for any injury that was committed with direct force, either
actual or implied, which created direct and immediate injury to
the person.3 Assault and battery both fell within the confines
of trespass.4 Trespass on the case, which was an outgrowth of
the law of trespass and gave a basis for relief for wrongful con-
duct which was not forcible or direct, came about centuries after
the action of trespass was recognized. Today some of the tech-
nical asininities which heretofore provided a fertile field for
judicial quibbling are looked upon as meaningless history, but
the law of torts undisputedly found its creation in common law
procedure.5
The technicalities which confronted every plaintiff are ex-
emplified in the famous "squib case." 6 The facts which were
established in the squib case were that a lighted squib, or bomb,
was tossed into a market house by the defendant, only to have
a bystander, who was attempting to protect himself, take up the
squib and throw it toward another stand in the market house. A
*Of the law firm of Hindry, Erickson & Meyer, of Denver, Colorado.
1 Prosser, Law of Torts 37 (3d ed. 1964), cites typical early English cases,
at footnote 86 therein.
2 Maine, Early Law and Custom 389 (1883).
3 Shipman, Common-Law Pleading p. 66 (3d ed. 1923).
4 Scott v. Shepherd, 3 Wils. 403, 2 Wm. Bl. 892 (1773).
5 Op. cit. supra, n. 2, at 389 et seq.
6 Scott v. Shepherd, supra, n. 4.
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second victim, fearing for his safety, threw the squib in yet
another direction, only to have a third victim, who was the re-
cipient of the last toss, suffer the loss of an eye from the ex-
plosion of the squib 7 Trespass was the writ that was sued out
against the defendant who first threw the bomb, and the action
in trespass was sustained. However, Sir William Blackstone, who
was a member of the court and one of the common law's most
famous authors, took the position that the harm was not im-
mediate and was not the direct result of the plaintiff's act, and
that, although liability was not in issue, case alone would be the
writ of action that the plaintiff would have to obtain if he were
to be allowed to recover damages.8
These ghosts of the past, consisting of vestiges of the com-
mon law forms of action for trespass and for trespass on the
case, have not only haunted the courts, but have also provided
historical enigmas in the law of assaultY The significance of
the forms of action in determining a plaintiff's right to recover
for assault has all but disappeared with the passage of time.
Today it is not controverted that recovery is available to a plain-
tiff who has been assaulted, and the plaintiff need not fear that
the modern rules of civil procedure will form a basis for de-
feating his right to recovery. As an outgrowth of our English
common law writs, we have the uncontroverted right to protec-
tion of an individual's interest in freedom from apprehension of
harmful or offensive conduct.1"
Analytical Framework
The courts have seldom failed to recognize that the most
important object of a civilized society is to protect an individual
7 Ibid.
8 Id.
9 Apparently, if we go back far enough, we come to the time when the
civil action for trespass for assault was "an action brought by the person
aggrieved by the actor's attempt to commit a battery upon him." Restate-
ment (2d), Torts § 24, comment c., at 41 (1965):
"c. Rationale. The apparent anomaly of the fact that almost from the
very beginning of the common law legal protection was accorded to the
interest in freedom from this one curious type of mental impression, but
until recently protection was denied to the interest in freedom from other
emotional disturbances which everyone recognizes as extremely distress-
ing, such as serious fright or anxiety for the safety of oneself or a member
of his family, is explainable only by the fact that the action for assault is
a survival from the time when the action of trespass gave to the persons
who were the victims of minor crimes a private right of action. The pri-
mary purpose of this action was to punish the wrongdoer, although the
major part of the penalty inmposed upon him went to the private in-
dividual aggrieved. The civil action of trespass for assault still presents a
strong analogy to criminal prosecutions for an attempt to commit a crime.
In reality, it was originally an action brought by the person aggrieved by
the actor's attempt to commit a battery upon him."
10 Prosser, op. cit. supra, n. 1, at 37, 38.
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against unlawful assaults, because without security against as-
sault, society loses most of its value. In recognizing the historical
basis for protection, the court, in Allen v. Hannaford,11 branded
the action of a landlord as an assault for his treatment of a
tenant when the plaintiff and his movers were threatened with
a pistol when they attempted to get the plaintiff's possessions
beyond the landlord's reach.
The dissent in the squib case may have provided Black-
stone12 with a background for the following statement that he
made as a guide to the bench and bar in 1790:
[A]ssault . . . [is] an attempt or offer to beat another,
without touching him; as if one lifts up his cane, or his fist,
in a threatening manner to another; or strikes at him but
misses him; this is an assault, insultus, which Finch de-
scribes to be "an unlawful setting upon one's person." This
also is an inchoate violence, amounting considerably higher
than bare threats; and therefore, though no actual suffering
is proved, yet the party injured may have redress by action
of trespass vi et armis; wherein he shall recover damages as
compensation for the injury.
The earliest assault case that the author has been able to
find was handed down in 1348, when a defendant suffered judg-
ment for striking out at another with a hatchet when his efforts
fell short of making actual contact, but caused harm and the
actual existence of a trespass.'3
Prosser has defined an assault as "apprehension of a harm-
ful or offensive contact with a person, as distinguished from the
contact itself," and also as "any action of such a nature as to
"1 14excite an apprehension of a battery ...
The American Law Institute, in its Restatement of the Law
of Torts,15 has provided the following definition:
§ 21. Assault
"(1) An actor is subject to liability to another for assault
if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive
contact with the person of the other or a third person, or
an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and
(b) the other is thereby put in such imminent ap-
prehension.
(2) An action which is not done with the intention
11 138 Wash. 423, 244 P. 700 (1926).
12 3 Blackstone, Commentaries 120 (1790).
13 I. de S. and Wife v. W. de S., [1348] Y. B. Lib. Assis., f. 99, pl. 60 [in
Gregory and Kalven, Cases and Materials on Torts, p. 794 (1959)].
14 Prosser, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 37, 38.
15 Restatement (2d) Torts § 21, at 37 (1965).
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stated in Subsection (1, a) does not make the actor liable
to the other for an apprehension caused thereby although
the act involves an unreasonable risk of causing it and,
therefore, would be negligent or reckless if the risk threat-
ened bodily harm.
Judicial Criteria of Whether an Assault Has Occurred
As the courts have been called upon to hear case after case,
the definitions have been peculiarly measured and tailored to fit
the fact situation in each particular case and have not provided
a uniform pattern for future use. 16 Many of the definitions of
assault define the condemned conduct as an intentional attempt
by a person, by force of violence to do an injury to the person of
another, or as any threatening gesture showing in and of itself,
or by words accompanying it, an immediate intention to commit
a battery. 17 Another definition that has been voiced is that an
assault is an unlawful offer of corporeal injury to another by
force, or force which is unlawfully directed to the person of
another under such circumstances as to create a well-founded
fear of immediate peril.1s
The criminal aspects of an assault have also led to confusion
because of the intermingling of the criminal act with the tortious
assault that finds remedy in a civil action. 19
The Restatement of Torts has clearly spelled out the fact,
which is supported by a wealth of case law, that words in and of
themselves ordinarily will not constitute an assault.
20
16 State v. Hazen, 160 Kan. 733, 165 P. 2d 234, 239 (1946), declared that too
frequently definitions have been so limited in their scope, because of the
facts involved, or so broadly stated as a result of an attempt to include all
situations that might arise, that confusion and misunderstanding has come
about in analyzing the definition of an assault as it relates to a fact situa-
tion.
17 Cook v. Kinzua Pine Mills Co., 207 Ore. 34, 293 P. 2d 717 (1956); Clark v.
Downing, 55 Vt. 259, 45 Am. Rep. 612 (1882); Peasley v. Puget Sound Tug
and Barge Co., 13 Wash. 2d 485, 125 P. 2d 681 (1942).
18 Brown v. Crawford, 296 Ky. 249, 177 S. W. 2d 1 (1944).
19 See, Perkins, An Analysis of Assault and Attempts to Assault, 47 Minn.
L. Rev. 71 (1962). See, also, Note: Civil Assault-Comparison with Crim-
inal Assault-Importance of Apparent Ability and Apprehension in Civil
Actions, 30 Tex. L. Rev. 120 (1951).
20 Restatement (2d), Torts § 31, p. 47 (1965):
"§ 31. Threats by Words.
"Words do not make the actor liable for assault unless together with
other acts or circumstances they put the other in reasonable apprehension
of an imminent harmful or offensive contact with this person." That words
alone, irrespective of their viciousness or propensity, to result in injury
of a physical or mental nature do not constitute an assault is not the end
of the matter. Such conduct may be actionable under the emergent tort
doctrine: intentional infliction of emotional harm. This new theory of tort
liability, while still in its embryonic stages, is separate and distinct from
the traditional doctrine of assault. For general background concerning this
(Continued on next page)
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Acts which aggravate an assault must, in final analysis, be
distinguished from those acts which constitute an assault. Gen-
erally, words or acts by a defendant that may embarrass and dis-
tress a plaintiff, and which may cause the greatest of indignity,
may not amount to an assault, but may aggravate and increase
the damage occasioned by the assault.2 ' Basically, an assault
is an intentional act, and without the requisite intent, recovery
will not be granted for harmful or offensive conduct.22
The cases which were formulated under the original con-
cepts of assault and battery have declared that an intention to
do harm, or an unlawful attempt, is not only an essential ele-
ment of the crime or tort, but also an important criterion in
fixing damages. 23 Some jurisdictions, with the passage of time,
have relaxed the strict requirements of intent, substituting
wantonness 24 or negligence 25 as the test.
In most cases, we all know that assault and battery generally
exist together, and it has become customary for the courts to
refer to the term "assault and battery" as if it were a single
thought and an action of its own. 26 Even though assault and
(Continued from preceding page)
new theory of tort liability, see Prosser, op. cit. supra, n. 1 at § 11, Infliction
of Emotional Distress; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the
Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033 (1936); Prosser, Insult and Outrage,
44 Cal. L. Rev. 40 (1956); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering:
A New Tort, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 874 (1939); Wade, Tort Liability for Abusive
and Insulting Language, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 63 (1950); Gregory and Kalven,
Cases and Materials on Torts, Ch. 12, pp. 787-860 (1959).
21 Stearns v. Sampson, 59 Me. 568, 8 Am. Rep. 442 (1871).
22 Restatement (2d) Torts § 32, p. 49 (1965):
"§ 32. Character of Intent Necessary.
"(1) To make the actor liable for an assault, the actor must have in-
tended to inflict a harmful or offensive contact upon the other or to have
put the other in apprehension of such contact.
"(2) If an act is done with the intention of affecting a third person in
the manner stated in Subsection (1), but puts another in apprehension of
a harmful or offensive contact, the actor is subject to liability to such other
as fully as though he intended so to affect him."
23 Gilmore v. Fuller, 198 Ill. 130, 65 N. E. 84 (1902); Perkins v. Stein, 94 Ky.
433, 22 S. W. 649 (1893); Newman v. Christian, 149 Neb. 471, 31 N. W. 2d
417 (1948); State v. Davis, 23, 1 Iredell's Law 125, 35 Am. Dec. 735 (N. C.
1840); MacDonald v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 210 Or. 395, 311 P. 2d 425 (1957);
Raefeldt v. Koenig, 152 Wis. 459, 140 N. W. 56 (1913).
24 People v. Carlson, 160 Mich. 426, 125 N. W. 361 (1910); Cook v. Kinzua
Pine Mills Co., supra, n. 17.
25 Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N. W. 12 (1905), wherein an assault
was charged for the performance of an unauthorized surgical operation,
and the court held that it was sufficient to show that the assault complained
of was wrongful and unlawful or the result of negligence, and that intent
was only necessary when a criminal prosecution was undertaken for as-
sault and battery.
26 Commonwealth v. McKie, 1 Gray 61 (Mass. 1854); State v. Maier, 13 N. J.
235, 99 A. 2d 21 (1952).
Jan., 1967
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1967
WHAT CONSTITUTES ASSAULT?
battery are separate and distinct causes of action, there is a re-
lation between them. An assault is the initial stage of the breach
of the peace which becomes more serious when it is increased to a
battery.2  Case law supports the statement that an assault is
"an inchoate battery," and that an assault is an intentional at-
tempt by force to do violence to the person of another, while
battery is the actual application to such person of the attempted
force and violence.28
Acts Which Do Constitute Assault
The cases which have dealt with the problem of what does
or does not constitute an assault have been couched in riddles of
cause and effect, abhorrence of viciousness, and protection of the
innocent. 29
Thus, a defendant has suffered judgment for his acts as a
landlord when he shook his fist under the nose of the demure
and pregnant plaintiff in an attempt to evict her.3°
The fact that a gun was unloaded has often been the con-
troversial point for the court, but has generally found the plain-
tiff securing judgment, even though no present ability to harm
existed.31 Generally, the use of a firearm by the defendant brings
about apprehension and fear in the plaintiff and results in a
finding that an assault has been committed.3 2
The utterance of threats, followed by a shot at the direction
where the plaintiff was standing, constitutes and assault, even
27 Mendenhall v. State, 18 Okla. Cr. 441, 196 P. 736 (1921); see, also, State
v. Davis, supra, n. 23, where the court declared that "Where an unequivocal
purpose of violence is accompanied by an act, which, if not stopped, or
diverted, will be followed by personal injury, the execution of the purpose
is then begun, the battery is attempted."
28 Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N. W. 814 (1926); Cook v. Kinzua
Pine Mills Co., supra, n. 17.
29 In Plonty v. Murphy, 82 Minn. 268, 84 N. W. 1005 (1901), it was held to
be an assault when a landlord entered the plaintiff's apartment without
permission and demanded that plaintiff's five-year-old son pick up trash
which was strewn throughout the back yard. The defendant landlord, in
his anger, had threatened to thrash the child, spoke angrily, and had raised
his fists as though to strike the plaintiff and had put her in fear of attack;
he was held liable.
30 Stockwell v. Gee, 121 OkI. 207, 249 P. 389 (1926).
31 Allen v. Hannaford, supra n. 11; Lowry v. Standard Oil Co., 63 Cal. App.
2d 1, 146 P. 2d 57, 60 (1944), wherein the court observed: "It is clear that
a person's right to live in a society free from being put in fear of personal
harm is invaded if he believes that an unloaded firearm being pointed at
him is loaded." See, also, State v. Godfrey, 17 Or. 300, 20 P. 625 (1889),
where it was held to be error to instruct the jury that if the victim
reasonably believed that the gun was loaded the actor was guilty and liable
for an assault, whether the gun was loaded or not.
32 Kline v. Kline, 158 Ind. 602, 64 N. E. 9 (1902), where the defendant was
found to have assaulted the plaintiff when he pointed a pistol at the plain-
tiff and threatened to shoot her and her child.
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though there is a time differential between the threats and the
shot and even though the plaintiff is not hitY3 A defendant has
been called upon to answer in money damages when he threat-
ened a pregnant plaintiff, while not more than one and one-half
feet away, with a threatened gesture of a club, and thereby
caused a miscarriage. 34 Even though the cases declare that
words do not constitute an assault, the holding of a walking stick
in a threatening position, with the utterance accompanying the
act of, "I will whip hell out of you," is an assault. 35
Physical contact is not an essential element, although
threatened or offered violence is. 36
Acts Which Have Not Amounted to Assault
All of the cases are dependent upon their own immediate
fact situations, and no formula has been found which will enable
a lawyer to predict with absolute certainty whether a particular
fact situation, with all of its attendant circumstances, will amount
to an assault in the eyes of the law. In Gelhaus v. Eastern Air-
lines,37 an officer of the defendant company, after firing the
plaintiff, threatened to have him thrown out if he was not off
the premises by five o'clock. The court, in reviewing the con-
duct of the defendant officer, had no difficulty in declaring that
there was no assault.
The manager of the defendant's store in Republic Iron &
Steel Co. v. Self, 3s told the plaintiff that she was no lady and
then called her a liar and ordered her out of the store. The
court declared that the conduct fell short of an assault, since
there was no threatening gesture to accompany the acts and
conduct complained of. The well-known fact that abusive words
will not in and of themselves constitute an assault was analyzed
by the court in Hixson v. Slocum. 39 In the principal case, the
court declared that the abusive words were not an assault, and
that, even though the defendant had hit the plaintiff, the plain-
tiff had justified the defendant's actions and could not com-
plain of the battery or of the abusive words.
In determining whether or not the plaintiff had assaulted
the defendant and had by his conduct justified the defendant's
assault on him, the court in Hulse v. Tollman,40 held that even
3 Nielson v. Eiler, 248 Mich. 545, 227 N. W. 688 (1929).
34 Holdorf v. Holdorf, 185 Ia. 838, 169 N. W. 737 (1918).
35 Trogden v. Terry, 172 N. C. 540, 90 S. E. 583 (1916).
36 Johnson v. Sampson, supra, n. 28.
37 194 F. 2d 774 (5th Cir. 1952).
38 192 Ala. 403, 68 S. 328 (1915).
39 156 Ky. 487, 161 S. W. 522 (1913).
40 49 Ill. App. 499 (1893).
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though the plaintiff had put his hand into his pocket where the
defendant knew he had a sling-shot, he had not assaulted the
defendant and did not give the defendant the right to attack him.
The courts have gone so far as to say that shooting a pistol
which was not aimed at the plaintiff and with the bald intention
of frightening the plaintiff, but without the intent to injure him,
was not an assault.4 1 It has also been held that threats to com-
mit harm, without an overt act, even though the evidence was
that the defendants did have blackjacks on their persons, did
not constitute an assault when the blackjacks were not exhibited
to the plaintiff. 42
In Hornaday v. Hornaday,4 3 the court declared that a ges-
ture, however vicious, could not be an assault in and of itself
without more. In Fraguglia v. Sala,44 the defendant's act in reach-
ing for a pitchfork without testimony to establish his intent to
attack the plaintiff was short of an assault in the eyes of the
court.
Conclusion
Assault, as it has been judicially defined, finds its basis in
the protection against the apprehension of receiving harmful or
offensive contact. It is the threshold for the more serious tort
of battery, the actual contact with the person of the plaintiff.
The law of assault has been developing over hundreds of
years and will continue to do so.
Of key importance to the tort, and the one factor more than
any other which differentiates the tort of assault from other
forms of intentional wrongdoing, is the element of apprehension
in the mind of the victim. Without the awareness by the victim
of the offered but uncompleted harmful or offensive contact,
there is no basis for a cause of action sounding in assault. It is
the mental tranquillity of the victim that the law of assault pro-
tects.
41 Degenhardt v. Heller, 93 Wis. 662, 68 N. W. 411 (1896).
42 Cucinotti v. Ortmann, 399 Pa. 26, 159 A. 2d 216 (1960).
43 95 Cal. App. 2d 384, 213 P. 2d 91 (1950).
44 17 Cal. App. 2d 738, 62 P. 2d 783 (1936).
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